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ABSTRACT 
 
 This work intends to be an application and understanding of the Christian just war 
tradition as it pertains to the actions of the United States government in Iraq. It includes a 
short history of the evolution of the tradition, the application and discussion of the three 
most controversial criterion, and a discussion of how the terror attacks on the World 
Trade Center may constitute a pre-emptive strike. Essentially, the piece endeavors to 
explore how untested, unseen dangers drive a government to act for the defense of its 
citizens and their way of life. The theory draws heavily on Michael Walzer’s invention of 
the concept of “supreme emergency” which allowed for exceptional actions during war if 
a people’s entire way of life is threatened.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 There is no doubt that the topic of war is one which has continued to challenge 
human society since its beginning. Indeed, our methods of waging war have evolved 
considerably since their inception. In much the same way, our ideas about when, how, 
and why to wage war have made strides as remarkable as the progression from a rock to a 
cruise missile. The moral discussion of war builds upon prior ideas and sets of standards 
for action which attempt to make war less horrible, or even avoidable. Yet, even given a 
seemingly endless set of rules governing conflict, wars continue to happen and, as a 
result, theorists continue to revise their thoughts as governing bodies impose new, more 
nuanced rules and considerations. My point is that no understanding of war is static. In 
the time it has taken to complete this work, current events continually force me to 
question mine and others’ theories.  Thus, in this work I seek to give the reader a 
snapshot of my theory as it applies to the morality of the recent conflict with Iraq. In what 
is a relatively short work I hope to convey an understanding that I believe is at the ethics 
of recent U.S. actions.    
September 11, 2001 was like any other day. I was in a History of the World class. 
I remember another student receiving a call on her cellular phone. After a chastising look 
from the professor, she hung up the phone and with an astonished look on her face told 
the class that a plane had crashed into the World Trade Center. I initially assumed it was 
some small accident which more than likely involved a single-engine Cessna that could 
2  
only have caused marginal damage to such a large building. As I walked through the halls 
to my next class, I noticed that everyone was talking on cell phones. I entered my next 
class and the professor promptly dismissed the students explaining that his wife worked 
at a government building in the city and he needed to contact her to make sure his child 
was safe. By this time, I was starting to catch on that something was really wrong. As I 
left the classroom, I attempted to call home to find out what was on the news, only to find 
that all cells were completely jammed with traffic. I decided to return to work and find 
out what happened. On my way to the Five Points MARTA station, I heard a report from 
the radio claiming that the Pentagon had been hit, and judging by the huge number of 
people on the train “evacuating” the city, it was becoming increasingly obvious that what 
I thought was a small accident was much more serious. When I finally arrived at work, 
everyone was hovering around the small twenty-year-old TV in the back of the office. 
Upon seeing the footage it became painfully obvious that the United States was under 
attack. This was no accident.  
 There are a million recollections such as mine about that day, many far more 
terrifying. After the 9/11 attacks, the clean up, and the damage control, the question on 
everyone’s mind was, how could this happen and what can we do to keep it from ever 
happening again? This question is at the heart of the actions taken in the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq. The legitimacy of the Iraq war has been possibly the most debated contemporary 
subject. Many, including myself, find themselves in a difficult situation. There was no 
direct attack on the United States by Iraq, nor can it be proven that Iraqi intelligence was 
in some way involved in the planning of the 9/11 attacks. The books I have read 
concerning the latter subject have been inconclusive. There are conjectures and “connect 
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the dots” explanations, but one cannot point to irrefutable evidence that Iraqi Intelligence 
helped the Al Qaeda hijackers. Yet, there is also irrefutable evidence that connects Iraq 
with Al Qaeda in other ways. This, combined with several Iraqi attempts to bomb U.S. 
embassies, set the stage for the country’s fear that an uncontrolled Iraq posed an 
immediate threat to its security.  
Certainly there are, as I intend to discuss, strong yet ultimately inconclusive 
arguments for the fulfillment of each of the major just war criteria concerning the war in 
Iraq. In the world before 9/11, it was easy to dismiss many fears and arguments as 
insufficient to justify drastic military action. Furthermore, until this point most terrorist 
attacks had been perpetrated on non-continental government and military targets, such as 
the bombing of U.S. embassies, the USS Cole, and attacks on military barracks. 
However, with the events of 9/11 a new world of possibilities became very real to the 
American people. A great fear pervaded the country as it became painfully obvious that 
we were not, as we had all come to believe after the end of the Cold War, invincible. On 
the contrary, the surprise attack by terrorists had resulted in drastic casualties; over one-
hundred and fifty civilians were killed for every terrorist who died in the World Trade 
Center. Against such odds, the specter of defeat loomed large.  
After the invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq became the most obvious target. It had 
openly defied U.N. resolutions, and it had a history of sponsoring terror bombing 
attempts such as that in Indonesia on January 18, 1991 and in the Philippines the next 
day. These actions lead one to suspect that Iraq would cooperate with terror groups like 
Al Qaeda. According to the book The Connection, Iraq had some irrefutable ties with Al 
Qaeda. “The authors of the document assert that bin Laden ‘is in good relationship with 
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our [the Mukhabarat] section in Syria’ The list was recovered after the war by the Iraqi 
National Congress…. The Defense Intelligence Agency has determined that the 
document is authentic.” 1 But where are the “pay stubs” that lead back to Al Qaeda? How 
does one argue that a specific training camp was used by a single group? In short, even 
though a document mentions bin Laden, how do we prove that the Iraqi government 
continued to aid him? Another area of concern for Iraq was the state of the people; 
practically the entire country, save those favored by the government, lived in poverty and 
faced starvation under harsh despotic conditions. United Nation embargos made life more 
than difficult and any attempt to ease these problems, like the Oil for Food program, was 
ultimately subverted by the government and funds were bled off for other less 
“humanitarian” uses. Unfortunately, when people are imprisoned in these deadly 
conditions, the nation becomes a breeding ground for individuals who resent and blame 
the world for their predicament and thus are ripe for recruitment into terror organizations.  
In this work I will endeavor to evaluate the way the Christian just war tradition 
would speak to the present situation. In chapter two I will offer a brief history of the 
tradition and the principles which contributed to its evolution throughout history. Next I 
will attempt to apply three of the key criteria of the tradition, evaluating whether or not 
the state of affairs before the invasion of Iraq fulfills these strictures. Finally in the 
concluding chapter I will posit a theory which can offer an explanation of how the just 
war theory may support the war in Iraq. 
My ultimate conclusion will be grounded in the precedent set by Michael Walzer 
in his book Just and Unjust Wars in which he discusses what he calls a “supreme 
                                                 
1 Hayes, Stephen F. The Connection. (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), 11.  
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emergency.” According to this theory, the leaders of a nation in extreme distress may 
gain the ability to set aside the principles of non-combatant immunity in order to 
accomplish the preservation of their way of life. In a parallel way I will posit the concept 
of “supreme threat” in which, not non-combatant immunity, but the criteria that 
determine whether one can embark upon a just war may be “modified” by the fact that a 
country faces a supreme danger in which a preemptive war is the single way to prevent its 
destruction. Their must be something greater at stake; the threat must be an attempt to 
violate not only the lives of the people of the nation but also to undermine their entire 
way of life, as Walzer puts it. Indeed, as I will suggest, we see this sort of subversion of 
the American lifestyle as the intent of the hijackers on 9/11. The World Trade Center was 
a symbol of the United States, not merely of its people, but what constitutes its 
philosophy of life.  
We will continue these ideas further in the conclusion, but let us first gain 
grounding in the key elements of the just war tradition in order to have a common basis 
for our discussion.   
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Chapter 2 
 
History of the Just War Tradition 
 
 
In order to consider the application of the Christian just war tradition in present 
day society and, as a result, the leading elements in the decision to invade Iraq, we must 
first have a grounding in the essential evolutions of the tradition. Each of the main criteria 
will be explored in a general way in order to create a reference point or standard by 
which the causes sighted for the Iraq War will be judged.  
Most major religions have developed a series of requirements which govern the 
actions of states engaged in war. Throughout history, the prevailing belief has been that 
states need coercive force to preserve sovereignty and the safety of their people. Thus, it 
is held that religions which have come into political power must develop some criteria 
that allows for the use of force in order to retain that power. If religion required the state 
to adopt a purely pacifistic moral code, it is feared that the result would likely be quick 
occupation by or destruction at the hands of a foreign power. Furthermore, without the 
ability to exercise coercive force, the government would be prohibited from providing 
necessary civil services; as Paul Christopher points out, “…if we were to adopt this 
[pacifist] interpretation, then no one should ever serve as a police officer, guard, or any 
other position that might require force.” 2  
In order to meld coercive force with Christianity, Christianity develops what 
comes to be called “the just war tradition.” Christianity began as a small persecuted 
religion with largely pacifist beliefs. Yet, one violent action, allegedly sponsored by God, 
                                                 
2 Christopher, Paul . The Ethics of War and Piece: An Introduction to Legal and Moral 
Issues. 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1999), 20. 
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encouraged many Christians to reconsider the use of military power. On October 28, 312 
A.D., the Roman general Constantine, after receiving, in a dream, the message ev tovtw 
nika (with this sign you shall conquer) superimposed on the cross, drew the conclusion 
that the Christian God was leading him into military battle. In recognition of his dream, 
he instructed his solders to paint the cross on their shields. In the ensuing battle, 
Constantine’s troops were victorious, defeating the army of Maxentius at the battle of 
Milvian Bridge. After his victory, Constantine legalized Christianity in the Roman 
Empire and poured state money into the building of churches. Constantine saw 
Christianity as a uniting force in his diverse empire and used state coercion to establish 
an orthodox theology at the Council of Nicea. Theodosius, a few decades after 
Constantine, promoted Christianity to the status of official state religion, and thus the 
Church became legally entangled with the coercive and warlike prowess of the Roman 
government. This turn of events was a serious departure from the suppressed, pacifistic 
minority that once was the Christian community. From this point on, mainstream 
Christians would assimilate the use of force as a method of retaining state power and 
influence, and accept coercion as a necessary evil for the preservation of a greater good. 
As a result of this need, and over the course of many centuries, a doctrine for permissible 
use of force was formulated.  
Saint Ambrose (339-397), an early theologian and bishop of Milan who lived 
during the fourth century, was the first Christian figure to begin the theory of just cause. 
The just cause argument is a limitation placed on the state requiring it to show a right or 
just reason for entering in to a conflict. In his Duties of the Clergy, Ambrose described 
one of the emerging duties of just cause: “He who does not keep harm off a friend, if he 
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can, is as much in fault as he who causes it.”3 Later these early innovations were picked 
up and combined to create a series of criteria for just cause in a conflict, but Ambrose’s 
standard, intervention for the protection of another, remains central to the modern 
understanding of just war.  
Saint Augustine (354-430), a contemporary of Ambrose but far more influential, 
was bishop of Hippo in northern Africa. Born in Tagaste in 354, he lived through the fall 
of Rome and died in Hippo in 430 as the city was under siege from “barbarians” (non-
Roman peoples). His ideas about war were tied to his life experiences and he worked to 
synthesize the beliefs of Christianity to the ability of a Christian to be a solder for the 
state. Augustine writes of the necessity of war: “As if he would not all the rather lament 
the necessities of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man; for if they were not just he 
would not wage them, and would therefore be delivered from all wars. For it is the 
wrongdoing of the opposing party which compels the wise man to wage just wars;…”4 
According to Augustine, Christians live in a world of necessary evils. That is to say, they 
subsist during the “in-between times” after the coming of Christ and his preaching of a 
kingdom of peace but before the eschatological event when Jesus will inaugurate his 
perfect kingdom. As inhabitants of this “in-between time,” Christians must tolerate and 
participate in “evils” which would not be required in Jesus’ Kingdom. Thus, a Christian 
state may regrettably have to go to war as a “necessary evil” provided that this war is 
“just.”  
                                                 
3 Christopher, The Ethics of War and Piece, 22. 
4 Augustine. City of God . (New York: Image Books Doubleday, 1958), 19. 
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Saint Aquinas (1225-1274) was the next major contributor to the just war 
tradition. However, understanding the origin of his ideas will first require a consideration 
of the times in which he lived. During the first Crusades, Christians encountered Muslim 
ideas of spiritual essence and philosophy of God, as well as Arabic translations of Greek 
philosophy such as Aristotle. This influx of classical Greek philosophy is important to 
Aquinas’s development of his natural law theory. Aquinas began to use reason to, he 
held, determine God’s law and set up a less subjective method through which one could 
make judgments about various circumstances based on experience and reason. Aquinas 
melded church doctrine with the logic of philosophers and paved the way for many of the 
legal considerations that are incorporated in modern just war tradition.  
Aquinas introduces a method for determining morality called natural law theory. 
Aquinas believes that the natural law is a portion of the divine law that humans have 
some ability to understand. Christopher explains: “all mankind has access to the eternal 
law (written [by means of their reason] in the mind of God) by discerning the 
fundamental tendencies of nature (natural laws); and by reflecting on these tendencies, 
rational agents can develop knowledge of the principles that underlie moral judgments.”5 
By applying and using the divine law one is capable of creating a hierarchy of ethical 
offences. Aquinas’ theory makes up a major part of the jus ad bellum (just reason for 
going to war) and is the basis for what is called jus in bello, justice in war. In his 
contribution to the jus ad bellum, “Aquinas stipulates that for a war to be just it must be 
declared by the authority of a head of state (proper authority), for a proportionally good 
                                                 
5 Christopher, The Ethics of War and Piece, 50. 
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reason (just cause), and with a morally good aim (right intention).6 Furthermore, his 
natural law theory sets up a relationship between intent and result. Aquinas would argue 
that, in a military situation, one is required to have a just intent. A government is not 
permitted to engage in indiscriminate killing of enemy civilians, for this exceeds the law 
of proportionality and is considered an act of murder since the death of innocent civilians 
is the government’s means to an end. Indeed, as Christopher explains “Aquinas is careful 
to stipulate that the harm done by the means employed in effecting justice must not 
exceed the harm that is being done by the injustice one seeks to correct.”7 The killing of 
civilians is permissible only when it is not the means to the end, and the evil does not 
outweigh the good produced. 
Just war tradition further developed with the introduction of international 
jurisprudence. The figure pivotal to the transformation of the Christian just war tradition 
into modern international law was Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). Grotius was born in 
Holland and lived through a drastic upheaval in the western world. The Catholic Church 
had lost much of its power and Europe had fragmented into many smaller nation states. 
Many of these nation states had imperial ambitions couched in enlightenment ideas. 
Grotius confronted a world where war was an everyday reality. His goal was “to prevent 
war; failing to prevent it he [and the tradition] seeks to minimize its brutality.”8 Thus 
Grotius distilled early Christian just war theory into legal thought and expanded the scope 
and implications of the tradition in the process. From this he set up an internationally 
recognized standard that seeks to limit the power of states to engage in arbitrary conflict. 
                                                 
6 Christopher, The Ethics of War and Piece, 51. 
7 Christopher, The Ethics of War and Piece, 52. 
8 Christopher, The Ethics of War and Piece, 81. 
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Grotius was the first to sketch the “skeleton” of what will be the jus in bello and jus ad 
bellum criteria.  
The most important time for the development of the modern just war tradition was 
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. During this time the ideas of Grotius were 
formulated into what is known as international law. Yet, this process is far from clear and 
straight forward. Because of the new theories of international law, there are many 
unanswered questions and untried premises.  Can international law be binding, and just 
what is this “law” based on? How can the values of one society be imposed on different 
cultures throughout the world? Proposing laws to restrict the conduct of war is plagued 
with enforcement problems. First, many believe that in times of war the law is silent and 
any expectations of obedience to rules should be dismissed. To these “realists,” war is by 
definition the break down of rules, and winning at all cost is the only concern. Save for a 
role it might play in tactical advantage, morality is worthless. Others propose a sliding 
scale of morality allowing countries to modify their actions based on the atrocities 
committed by their foes. Perhaps, the most difficult challenge just war and international 
law face is legal positivism.  
The legal positivists believe that there is a fundamental difference between ethics 
and law. They argue that any universal international law will fail because it will give an 
advantage to those who may choose not to follow it. Essentially, the argument is that in a 
time of war “law exists, but who will enforce it?” There is no overall governing body for 
the world that will use coercion to enforce the laws, and without a shared understanding 
of morality and a common distrust of “opportunistic realism,” nations are free to act as 
they wish so long as they are capable of overpowering any foe. 
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Despite the individual philosophical discussions which have come about in the 
international law debate, just war has been adapted into the thought process of many 
western countries. Indeed, when George H. W. Bush issued his reasons for the first gulf 
war, they fit almost perfectly and quite self consciously into the stated requirements of 
the theory. Indeed, in his speech George H. W. Bush makes clear ideas such as just cause 
to aid Kuwait, last resort after U.N. sanctions have failed, and a specific just intent.9 
Furthermore, the extent of the first Gulf War was governed by the stated intentions of this 
traditional theory. War was undertaken to defend a sovereign nation, and after this goal 
was fulfilled the army was called off (much to the consternation of some realists who 
thought that Saddam Hussein should have been toppled). Today the just war tradition has 
become an almost unconscious common vernacular throughout the populous. People not 
only expect that a war must be winnable, they expect there to be a just reason to embark 
upon it. They expect wars to be conducted through conventional and controlled means, 
and for alternate, peaceful means to be pursued if at all possible. These expectations, 
along with several others, seem to constitute a common version of what scholars see as 
modern just war theory.  This brings us to the point where we shall address the academic 
version of just war and become familiar with the vernacular which will be present in our 
discussion throughout the body of this work.  
The first element of modern just war, the jus ad bellum, or just reasons for going 
to war, is generally accepted to have seven criteria. According to the tradition all of these 
                                                 
9 Bush, George HW. President George Bush Announcing the War Against Iraq. (The 
History Place: Great Speeches Collection. http://www.historyplace.com/speeches/bush-
war.htm). 
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requirements must be met for a government to justly use military force. Each requirement 
contains many subsets, or contingent ideas, spawned by specific situations in history that 
have influenced the evolution of the criterion. The requirements of the jus ad bellum are 
as follows: (1) there must be a just occasion or cause; (2) war must be made by a lawful 
authority; (3) the country must have a just intent; (4) war must be the only means for 
righting the wrong; (5) there must be a reasonable hope of victory; (6) the good produced 
must outweigh the evil; and (7) only right means may be used in the conduct of the war. 
We will briefly discuss each of these criteria. In addition, the three criteria most 
important to this project --just cause, just intent, and reasonable hope of victory-- will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapters.  
In order to meet the first requirement of just occasion, or just cause, a nation must 
have a just reason for the use of force. The most universally acceptable circumstance is 
self defense; yet, self defense can be interpreted in a number of ways. For some 
interpreters, it can include pre-emptive strikes against probable attacks; for other theorists 
a country may also intervene in the defense of another nation or people who are facing 
mortal danger.  
 The second criteria states that war must be declared by a lawful authority. This 
requires that the sovereign authority of a state has the sole prerogative to declare war on 
its behalf. This is a relatively simple concept, though it is not without circumstantial 
complications. For example, there is the problem of rebellion in which war may, it would 
seem, justly be declared against a ruthless despot, but, by an uprising that is obviously not 
lead by the legally considered sovereign authority. Another ambiguity may become more 
problematic in the future. As organizations like the United Nations (U.N.) claim status as 
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world authorities, it becomes difficult to discern in which body rests sovereignty and 
whether individual countries have the right to declare war. At this point, most 
commentators would hold that the U.N. does not wield such control. Yet, the European 
Union (E.U.) may be a more interesting example. Are each of the nations involved in the 
E.U. sovereign enough to declare a just war, or does it require a consensus of all 
participating nations? 
 Just intent is concerned with the objectives of a nation that enters a war. In short 
“a nation waging a just war should be doing so for the cause of justice and not for reasons 
of self-interest or aggrandizement.”10 In chapter four, this element will be discussed in 
depth. 
 The requirement of last resort seems simple, but like all the criteria there are a 
plethora of nuances. Simply put, last resort requires that war should only be employed 
after all peaceful possibilities have been exhausted. This does not, however, apply once a 
nation has been attacked; at that point a response of force may be immediate, for the 
purpose of a standing army, in addition to serving as a deterrent, is to provide the 
capability to respond immediately when deterrence fails.11 Yet, in many cases there is 
much debate about the point at which a state decides that diplomacy has failed and there 
is no other choice but war. There are so many different recourses available, at what point 
is war the only choice left? Can assassination be used if it will avert war? Are threats of 
nuclear attack permissible to resolve conflict?  
                                                 
10 Moseley, Alexander. Just War Theory. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/j/justwar.htm. 
11 Christopher, The Ethics of War and Piece, 88. 
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 A reasonable hope of victory is required. Even if every other element of the just 
war tradition is fulfilled, one must have a reasonable hope that the war can be won. Of 
course, this is difficult because one must first establish what is meant by victory. In 
chapter five the specific requirements of a victory in the Iraq war will be discussed. 
Simply defeating an army is not necessarily sufficient for victory, especially when the 
threat which spurred a war is not neutralized with this one result.  
 The end result of the war must create more good than evil. In other words, the war 
must, in the end, make life better for the nations involved. This is usually considered to 
be an issue of proportionality. Instead of focusing on a single occurrence, this 
requirement judges the probability of the overall outcome of the entire war. World War II 
may be a helpful example. By defeating the Nazis one could see an end to the turmoil and 
ever-expanding conflict which had engulfed all of Europe and threatened to spread 
throughout the world. Under this criterion, one may easily believe that the evil created by 
going to war was not as great as that which would have been created had Nazi Germany 
been allowed to continue its efforts unchecked. Thus the war created more good than the 
evil it caused.  
 Just means requires that only moral methods be employed in fighting. Such moral 
methods are crucial to making judgments about whether or not any of the other criteria 
can be fulfilled. For instance, one is not permitted to satisfy the criterion of reasonable 
hope of victory by stating that, should worst come to worst, one can employ nuclear 
weapons against the enemy citizenry and thus bring about victory. Such an act would 
severely violate the requirements of just means. One must make a judgment about the 
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other criteria by considering the use of only moral actions. These methods are dictated in 
the just war tradition by the jus in bello.   
The jus in bello is, alongside the jus ad bellum, one of the two essential elements 
of a “just war.” This tradition addresses the morality of a country’s actions once a conflict 
has been initiated. The jus in bello consists of two major principles: discrimination and 
proportionality.  
Discrimination concerns itself with actions preformed during conflict that would 
intentionally target the innocent and hence violate moral law. Just war takes special care 
to point out that moral laws may not be suspended in war, thus refuting the idea of inter 
arma silent leges (in times of war the law is silent).12 By maintaining moral codes, such 
as that against murder, a government in a just war is in line with the natural law. This is 
illustrated in the idea that killing civilians as your end or as the means to your end is not 
permissible, even in a time of war. It is considered murder.  This principle allows for 
what we consider collateral damage. In destroying a military target a certain amount of 
“civilian casualties” may be expected and permitted if the attacker does not require the 
death of these innocents to achieve the end of destroying a military target.  
Proportionality addresses the scope of discrimination. That is to say, the evil of 
casualties produced cannot outweigh the good produced by the act. Each act within the 
war must result in more good than evil. Hence, even discriminate acts can be prohibited if 
they would produce a larger amount of destruction with only moderate military benefit.  
                                                 
12 Walzer, Michael . Just and Unjust Wars. (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 3.  
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 If one of the requirements we have just discussed is not fulfilled, whether before 
the war as the jus ad bellum or during it under the jus in bello, then the Iraq war is not 
just. It is important to keep in mind the ideas briefly discussed in this chapter. Our 
following discussion will use this traditional understanding as a foundation. We shall 
apply three most controversial criterions separately, and then discuss how the tradition 
has been developed and re-interpreted from this strict foundation.   
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Just Cause 
 
 
 Perhaps the most important and debated point concerning the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq is whether or not the United States had a just cause to use force. This question, 
however, cannot be answered simply. There are numerous shades of gray that permeate 
one’s intentions, foreknowledge, action, and responsibility. The idea of just cause, 
founded in the thoughts of Augustine in the late fourth century, were intended in part to 
curb the indiscriminate use of military force which was rampant in the world at that time. 
Once a nation recognizes that it must possess a just cause to use military force, much 
violence can be avoided. Indeed, this concept constrains the use of violence to expand 
one’s fortune. One might even go so far as to characterize it as an attempt to control state 
sponsored theft. Augustine sights the example of the pirate captured by Alexander the 
Great, who, when asked about his crimes, retorts that the only difference between the two 
of them is that Alexander practices piracy on a larger scale. “You and I are doing the 
same thing. We are leading exactly the same kind of life, only I am doing it in a very 
small measure. I may rob a few individuals and trading boats here and there, but you are 
doing it on a wide scale. How many countries you have conquered! How many lives you 
have needlessly destroyed! How many valuable treasures you and your soldiers have 
plundered! I tell you, it is you who should be ashamed, not I.”13 Just cause disagrees with 
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enlightenment/part5/5.html. 
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the pirate and rests on the fundamental principle that force can be justifiable when it 
seeks a just end. Yet, much as an amendment in the Bill of Rights leads to a plethora of 
laws addressing every variable where that right could be infringed, so too the principle of 
just cause raises questions about when exactly is one’s end just.   
Today the idea of self-defense has progressed to the point where, in some 
theorists’ eyes, a just cause may be present before physical aggression has occurred. 
Many believe that a potential victim may establish sufficient grounds for a “pre-emptive 
strike” in order to subvert the possibility of upcoming civilian losses. Furthermore, an 
idea develops that one may use force to intervene in the case of a repressive régime. Jean 
Elshtain characterizes this intervention by arguing that “killing to defend oneself alone 
was not enjoined: It is better to suffer harm than to inflict it. But the obligation of charity 
obliges one to move in another direction: To save the lives of other, it may be necessary 
to imperil and even take the lives of their tormenters.”14 Indeed, even Grotious builds the 
idea of humanitarian intervention into The Law of Peace and War stating, “.…those who 
possess rights equal to those of kings. Have the right of demanding punishments not only 
on account of injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account 
of injuries which do not directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature or 
of nations in regard to any persons whatsoever”15 As a whole, international law agrees 
that should an opponent attack unprovoked, it has acted unjustly and a nation may justly 
respond by defending itself with military force. Christian moral theory further expands 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
14 Elshtain, Jean B. Just War Against Terror. (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 57. 
 
15 Christopher, The Ethics of War and Peace, 191. 
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just cause to include an obligation to assist others in their struggle for liberation from an 
oppressive régime and allows a nation to come to the aid of a country being threatened by 
a hostile, unprovoked force. Additionally, the idea of self-defense extends to an 
anticipated act of aggression. The very existence of a standing army is a recognition of 
the idea that a force may be needed not only after an attack but once a threat begins to 
materialize. “Therefore, it is commonly held that aggressive war is only permissible if its 
purpose is to retaliate against a wrong already committed (e.g., to pursue and punish an 
aggressor) or to pre-empt an anticipated attack.”16 
Once pre-emption as a possibility is recognized, it falls to the theorist to judge just 
what acceptable grounds for such an extreme action are. The idea of this pre-emptive war 
is ripe for abuse causing any action of this nature which is undertaken quickly and 
cavalierly to seem like aggression. A nation must weigh possible actions carefully before 
embarking upon a pre-emptive strike. Unfortunately, leadership is not privileged to the 
inner workings of the goals and intent of the “enemy” and must, as a result, make 
decisions on limited information. It becomes exceedingly clear that national mood and 
tensions become very important to this decision.  Ultimately, however, the decision for a 
pre-emptive strike must fall to public representatives who “are always compelled to act in 
a kind of fog.”17 Therefore, pre-emptive strikes are a kind of “educated bet” with the 
government hoping to gain the upper hand to prevent the death of their civilians.  
Consider the nation that sees a buildup of forces along its border, threatening 
national interest, and instilling fear in the citizens of a peaceful country. It is not prudent, 
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nor is it in keeping with the spirit of just cause, to claim that these acts are not equivalent 
to an act of aggression and, thus, that the threatened country had no just grounds to 
defend itself. If a pre-emptive invasion offers the possibilities of fewer casualties, and a 
more reasonable hope of victory, then it should be employed.  
The just war theorist must also look back upon just cause after a conflict has 
ended. This allows the theorist to understand what elements led to the conflict and aids in 
making a better judgment the next time. On a long enough timeline the understanding of 
all elements of the conflict will become clearer, and one will gain the opportunity to 
evaluate decisions more objectively. Once we understand contributing factors we may 
use them to set precedent and determine how we should act in the future. Looking back 
on previous wars can help us make judgments about future conflicts and allows us to 
determine whether or not our goals are realistic. In Iraq the United States may expect to 
rebuild the country and create an economically powerful and stabilizing force where a 
dangerous and unpredictable regime once stood. American post-war actions with Japan in 
WWII set a precedent for this. The United States completely rebuilt and reorganized 
Japan and today it is one of the wealthiest countries on earth.  
 Also, if a country has acted in a particularly dangerous and unpredictable way in 
the past, then we must take this into account when judging its potential threat in the 
future. We may illustrate this with a popular idea that pervaded in the Cold War era. 
Mutually assured destruction was enough to deter either side from initiating a nuclear 
strike and thus prevented war. However, this idea was predicated on the belief that both 
sides viewed “mutually assured destruction” as the worst possible scenario. However, 
had the USSR proved in its past action to be entirely self destructive and suicidal, it 
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would have been more plausible at the time to believe that the Soviets would initiate a 
strike even if they knew it would result in the destruction of both sides. 
 Finally, with the idea of just cause and pre-emptive action in mind, how these 
principles relate to the war in Iraq should be considered. Did the United States have just 
cause for the pre-emptive strike in order to topple the Hussein régime? There are three 
aspects of just cause which may justify the invasion: (1) as a response to direct hostile 
military acts; (2) as a response to a perceived threat which places one in enough danger to 
warrant a pre-emptive strike; or (3) as intervention to assist others against an oppressive 
and murderess government. Unless one of these elements can be undoubtedly proven, the 
United States would lack sufficient cause to attack. 
These three aspects have a kind of “pecking order.” Direct hostile action from an 
opposing force is tantamount to an immediate fulfillment of just cause; there is little 
argument concerning whether retaliation is justified once an explicit invasion has 
occurred. In the case of Iraq one cannot see an outright act of aggression. Forces were not 
mobilized; no navy blockaded our shores; and an invasion was not mounted in the 
traditional sense. Instead the strongest case to be made for Iraq’s participation in “direct 
hostile military action” against the United States is through terrorism. Under this 
umbrella we see many acts of aggression in which Iraqis attempted, usually 
unsuccessfully, to blow up American embassies. “January 18, 1991, the day after the 
Gulf War began, police in Indonesia defused a bomb planted in a flower box below a 
window of the U.S. ambassador’s residence in Jakarta. An Iraqi operative had secretly 
inserted himself into a team of laborers renovating the home and buried twenty-six sticks 
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of TNT in the dirt.”18 Then “The following day, on January 19, 1991, Ahmed J. Ahmed 
and Absul Kadham Saad, two Iraqi students living in the Philippines, attempted to 
detonate a bomb at the U.S. government building that housed the U.S. Information 
Service and the Thomas Jefferson Cultural Center in Manila.”19 However, these instances 
are trumped by a key question, “was Iraq involved in the planning and execution of the 
Al Qaeda terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001?” If Iraq was 
involved, then to what extent does its involvement qualify as a direct act of aggression 
and what responsibility would it bear for “initiating hostilities?” Indeed, if one could 
prove this involvement, one could wrap up this entire chapter here. If Iraq had 
orchestrated the World Trade Center attack there could be no refuting the presence of a 
just cause by most just war standards. However, Iraqi involvement with Al Qaeda is 
shady at best. The Bush administration claims that “Iraq’s connections with Osama bin 
Laden and Al Qaeda”20 were one of the reasons for the invasion. Congress echoed this 
assertion in its joint resolution on Iraq asserting, “…The United States is determined to 
prosecute the war on terrorism and Iraq's ongoing support for international terrorist 
groups combined with its development of weapons of mass destruction in direct violation 
of its obligations under the 1991 cease-fire and other United Nations Security Council 
resolutions make clear that it is in the national security interests of the United States and 
in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council 
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resolutions be enforced, including through the use of force if necessary.”21 Yet, though it 
may seem to the President and Congress that evidence of Iraqi involvement in terrorism 
was sufficient to warrant targeting the Hussein régime, there is not outright proof which 
would satisfy the current understanding of just cause. In fact, Grotious himself states, “if 
there is any doubt about whether a cause is just, one must refrain from war….”22 While 
we cannot believe that the just war tradition is to be a “suicide pact” in which principles 
can never be altered regardless of mounting threats, the current understanding of the 
tradition fails to speak to an ambiguous and dangerous threat such as terrorism.  
 The second element of just cause concerns the use of a pre-emptive strike to 
defend against a perceived and imminent threat. Pre-emption is the newest, least 
understood, and most indefinite element of just cause. Once again I believe that the 
evidence we see is not enough to show convincingly that Iraq would, at a point in the 
near future, have initiated some sort of devastating military strike on this United States. 
The strongest argument here is the idea that Iraq may have attempted to construct a 
nuclear or biological weapon which then could have been used either to threaten its 
neighbors or to hand off to a terrorist group with the ability to infiltrate the United States. 
In a joint resolution from the House and Senate passed in October 2002, Congress agreed 
that, “Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United 
States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in 
material an unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, 
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continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons 
capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring 
terrorist organizations.”23 However, if these suspicions warranted some type of pre-
emptive strike, one must wonder why an invasion was the only solution. Would not just 
war speak to a surgical strike to neutralize production facilities?  
The precedent established by Israel will plague any attempt to use Iraq’s weapons 
program as a justification for the invasion. After being hit repeatedly by “Al Hussein” 
cruise missiles, in 1981 the Israelis discovered the construction of a nuclear power plant 
in northern Iraq that could be used to enrich uranium. This presented an extreme threat; if 
this plant was allowed to “go hot” as its smaller sister reactor had just done (the sister 
reactor was too small to enrich weapons grade uranium) Iraq would obtain nuclear 
capability. Perceiving this future threat, in 1981 the Israeli government chose to initiate a 
strike in which combat aircraft took off from Israel, flew across Jordanian and Saudi 
Arabian airspace, and destroyed the power plant returning to Israel unharmed. In this 
quick action the plant was destroyed and the threat was neutralized. Why could the 
United States not use a similar method to neutralize weapon capabilities? Why was an 
invasion necessary?   
The third aspect of just cause to be addressed is that of intervention in defense of 
others. This theory becomes bogged down in numerous terminology problems. Was 
Iraq’s ability to attack and to occupy one of its neighbors a sufficient threat for the United 
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States to “intervene” for a neighboring country’s defense? Perhaps merely the ability to 
attack a neighbor, through the use of some long-range missile system, is sufficient hostile 
intent?  Do such attacks already have to have occurred or is the threat sufficient? 
The main fighting force of the Iraqi army was wiped out in Desert Storm, along 
with much of their ability to launch medium- to long-range missiles against surrounding 
countries. Furthermore, what long-range weaponry was left after the first Gulf War was 
ineffectual in comparison to the capabilities possessed by other much more dangerous 
régimes, like Iran and North Korea.  
 The strongest argument to be made for intervention is in assisting others against a 
repressive government. One could certainly argue that the Iraqi regime was oppressive. 
Hussein drained much of the country’s resources in order to build “bomb proof” palaces. 
Secrete police ravaged the population creating a constant state of fear, like that of the 
Stalin period. People were imprisoned and tortured, executions had become 
commonplace. “According to Human Rights Watch, ‘Each year their have been reports of 
dozens-sometimes hundreds-of deaths, with bodies of victims at times left in the street or 
returned to families bearing marks of torture: eyes gouged out, fingernails missing, 
genitals cut off, and terrible wounds and burns.”24 Thus, the United States may intervene 
to help fellow humans liberate themselves from an oppressive regime.   
 This argument, though, begs the question: why did the United States wait until 
now to assist in the liberation of the Iraqi people? At the end of the first Gulf War 
America had the perfect opportunity to continue pushing forces to Baghdad and bring 
down the regime. There were uprisings in the south of Iraq sparked by the request of the 
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United States government. However, the U.S. abandoned the idea and permitted Iraqi 
helicopter-gun-ships to fly in “no-fly zones”, thus giving the Iraqi military the perfect 
opportunity to destroy any anti Hussein voices. Americans watched as marshes were 
drained and poisoned to starve people while others were gassed with chemical weapons. 
If there ever was a time for intervention against a repressive regime it was in the first 
Gulf War.  
 Why then did America intervene in 2003? Iraq had been given time to rearm, and 
then the U.S. choose to attack. Indeed there was some significant change that had taken 
place in the outlook and policy of the United States after September 11th. There was 
something that convinced America that the thereat from Iraq required immediate 
attention. Perhaps it was political opportunism, perhaps it was fear. 
 The Iraqi invasion does not completely satisfy the requirements of a traditional 
application of just cause principles. No overt attack upon the U.S. by Iraq can be proven. 
The removal of Iraqi nuclear and chemical weapons, if they existed, could have been 
accomplished by strategic means, such as that employed by Israel, rather than by 
invasion. Human rights violations had been ignored in the past, both in Iraq and 
elsewhere.  
In Iraq, we made our decision based on a lack of information. There was no 
absolute proof of Iraqi complicity in terrorist attacks on the U.S. There was no knowledge 
of the exact whereabouts or even the existence of Iraqi weapons construction and, hence, 
there was no perfect single strike which could eliminate a specific threat.  Instead the 
invasion involved a total overthrow of the government and a systematic sweeping of the 
entire country to uncover a potential myriad of hidden threats. This action does not fit 
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well with the traditional application of just cause. In the conclusion we will explore just 
how this new threat may be judged by a more progressive view of just war theory.
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Chapter 4 
 
Just Intent 
 
 
The second major aspect of just war tradition we will address is that of just intent. 
First let us consider a brief illustration to understand the problems that may during such a 
discussion.  
Consider a nation, we shall call it Temoren. This nation has a population of a 
hundred million people. Within its borders there is a village that is occupied by a 
thousand Temoren citizens. A village, let us call it Bouson, is being persecuted by the 
central government of Temoren; in fact, the central government wishes to exterminate the 
people of Bouson. When presented with this injustice we must ask some key questions 
before embarking on a campaign of intervention. Further complicating the matter, let us 
consider that there are five villages in other locations throughout our fictitious globe that 
face the same problem. Thus we have two major questions, first, should we intervene, 
and second if we do see sufficient cause to act, how do we choose which of these villages 
to save? In our hypothetical situation, if we as a “world power” do choose to protect 
Bouson, how might we ethically define our purpose?  
In a sense this third question is the essence of just intent. The actions we take are 
under the scrutiny of just war criteria and from a traditional standpoint this intent must be 
pure. Just intent argues “a nation waging a just war should be doing so for the cause of 
justice and not for reasons of self-interest or aggrandizement. Putatively, a just war 
cannot be considered to be just if reasons of national interest are paramount or 
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overwhelm the pretext of fighting aggression.”25 Essentially the tradition argues that for a 
nation to declare a just war there must exist nothing but a desire for justice. In keeping 
with the Christian spirit of just war tradition, our “world power” should be intervening to 
protect its neighbor. This action should in no way be calculated to benefit our nation for 
aiding another. Bouson is to be protected purely because the central government of 
Temoren is an unprovoked aggressor. Now consider that the village of Bouson sits on a 
huge supply of gold. As long as this village remains free, the price and supply of gold 
remains constant throughout the world. However, should the central government of 
Temoren destroy these people and seize their resources, they will corner the gold market, 
causing prices to rise and bringing powerful economic countries to their knees. This 
threat would be very important to a major economic power. Our “superpower” is now 
willing to spend manpower and resources to defend this village against injustice, while at 
the same time looking after its own economic interest. The distinction between Bouson 
and the other villages is now more pressing. Bouson has been selected for defense out of 
self-interest, and, as such, our action cannot be defended in the traditional reading of just 
intent. Our nation will claim it is intervening on behalf of the rights of Bouson, and this 
will be a true claim, yet it will also be intervening on behalf of its economy. Thus, we are 
faced with the ultimate question: if justice is served in the process of seeking benefit for 
one’s self does this make the action unjust? 
Just war theory traditionally answers this question with a yes. The problem is that 
this clear-cut view is often unattainable in real world scenarios. Nation states harbor 
many abstract and, at times, unknowable motivations which cannot be equated to justice. 
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It is hard to know, in the human psyche, the real reason behind any action, and more 
often than not the motivation for an action contains a number of instigating factors. Just 
intent, according to a strict reading of the tradition, does not endeavor to judge whether or 
not there is a “preponderance of the evidence;” it avoids the consideration that, “the 
reasons for this action were mostly just with a small element of self interest involved.” 
The problem, then, is how to reconcile the theory with practical application. Indeed, as 
Elshtain points out, “We can not plum the depths of people’s souls. We can only judge 
their words and deeds”26 This is true, but we must make a judgment. Since just war 
purports to be a tradition by which states abiding by it are protected, one’s judgment 
becomes clouded when one is faced with a threat that is not specifically addressed.  
Perhaps an example may better illustrate this point. Let us consider that I have an 
unhealthy relative, my grandmother. For my grandmother’s future survival, it is 
imperative that she have bypass heart surgery. This is a routine surgery in which a 
favorable outcome is almost certain. Furthermore, I am without means; this requires me 
to live with my grandmother. My grandmother is unsure about this surgery, she knows 
that she is not feeling well but nonetheless the small percentage of a chance that 
something could go wrong frightens her and she is wavering. This is the point at which I 
intervene and I will face a similar philosophical dilemma as the nation intervening 
through the just war tradition. My primary obligation is love for my grandmother and I 
should encourage her to have the surgery because it will result in a good which is the 
prolonging of her life. However, I also have another motive. I know that this surgery will 
require my grandmother to remain in the hospital for at least two weeks. During this time 
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I would have the house entirely to my self and that would allow me to have a party and 
exercise other freedoms that would otherwise be forbade. Now my intervention cannot be 
considered to be one-hundred percent for the good of prolonging my grandmother’s life, 
but it also involves self-interest on my behalf that would benefit me. Should this then bar 
me from convincing my grandmother to have the operation? While I have cast my friend 
in an unfavorable light, I have not divulged all of the reasons why I shared what might 
well have been useful information and good advice. Thus, to judge any situation 
correctly, we must adopt an enlightened view of just intent and understand that the 
motivating factors which serve justice are always intertwined with “selfish” interest; to 
think otherwise seems quite naive. Yet, far from impeding just action, this “selfishness” 
actually helps spur a nation to perform just acts.  
The fact of the world is that rarely, if ever, do nation-states take action out of the 
goodness of their hearts; instead there is some self-centered motive that compels action. 
Thus, when considering intent, we are required to weigh the contributions of a host of 
influences on the decisions, and though we may wish to have an assayer, we have, at least 
at this point in human development, a rudimentary balance. Yet before attempting to 
weigh such an action, we should explore how this would be judged from the traditional 
standpoint.  
The traditional reading of just war, commonly called absolutism, would certainly 
consider my views to be pure blasphemy. However, the idea of just intent itself is 
defeating for absolutists for there has never been and never will be a conflict that was 
based purely on justice. The civil war was fought as much for central government power 
as it was for the freedom of slaves. World War II was fought, in part, because the loss of 
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Europe as an American market could not be allowed; the liberation of the Jews and other 
oppresses peoples was not the only reason. History is filled with numerous examples that 
few would contest were wars for justice, which made the world a better place, yet they 
were initiated, in part, by selfish interest. From an absolutist standpoint, these wars could 
not be seen as just. In fact if an absolutist were to conservatively stick to his or her 
“guns” (so to speak), we might correctly term this person a pacifist. As Augustine points 
out, “A good man would be under compulsion to wage no wars at all, if there were not 
such things as just wars.”27 Since one’s intent is never pure and since wars will never fit 
perfectly into our expectations of just intent, we must realize that this criterion may only 
be fulfilled imperfectly. I fail to see how those who style themselves absolutist yet still 
allow for “just wars” are really anything more than, in practice, hypocrites or self-
delusional.  
Those of us who understand the world to have unavoidable grey areas will now 
endeavor to apply, to the best of out ability, the knowledge which we do have about the 
motivating factors in the Iraq War.  
First let us construct our scale of just intent. Just intent states that a nation waging 
war should do so in the name of justice and not for self interest and aggrandizement. If 
“national interests” becomes more important than the goal of fighting aggression, then 
the war is no longer just. However, the term national interest is problematic. 
Characteristics like maintaining global peace, safety, and law are all aspects of our 
national interest yet are just in their own right. Thus we must ask, “If the result of a war is 
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a just and stable régime governing Iraq, which emphasizes human rights and law, then is 
this good somehow negated by the idea that this outcome would also serve the interest of 
the United States?” Of course not! To deny that a stable régime is a good and to argue 
that this is not in keeping with the spirit of the just war tradition would be foolish. The 
only party that is not served by such logic is the tyrant running the oppressive régime. 
Just war does not take up for a dictator who murders the very people which government 
is to protect.   
Further problematizing the situation, governments are the only authorities capable 
of waging war; yet, they are secular authorities whose sole purpose is the public good and 
the interest of their citizens. Thus, to ask a government to wage a war for nothing more 
that the furtherance of civil justice for citizens of other nations is counter to the interest 
and the purpose of a state. War requires a massive outpouring of resources. Tremendous 
amounts of money, lives, and equipment are at risk in military action. How can a secular 
authority pursue this course of action if it does not contribute to the national interest? 
Thus the United States laments, according to Elshtain, that “we rightly fault ourselves for 
too little intervention in situations of genocide….” Elshtain reminds us, though “…[in the 
case of Iraq] moral responsibility and enlightened self-interest combine.”28 This 
“enlightened self-interest” then allows a nation-state to commit its resources to a moral 
action which carries a selfish benefit for its citizens. Thus our choice to use coercive 
action in Iraq was one that would both benefit the citizens of Iraq as well as the United 
States.  
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This enlightened self-interest theory, however, grows more complex when we 
begin to ask questions like “to what extent, if any, did national interest outweigh the 
interest of justice?” Was national interest economic or civil security? And most 
importantly “was this action really in the ‘national interest’?” Not all of these questions 
will be answered at this point. Simply shaping the first two will take us into an intense 
discussion. The third question will be the most important when we consider the way that 
the just war tradition is seen today and the ways in which it will adapt to meet the ever 
new and changing challenges of the world.  
When considering the weight of national interest and justice, we are presented 
with a difficult and harsh reality. The doctrine of enlightened self-interest requires that 
the justice imposed by our coercive force benefit our country to the extent that it warrants 
the resources to which we are required to commit. When we consider the world at the 
time before the Iraq war, we see a number of instances in which coercive power could 
have been used. Problems in Korea, Somalia, Darfour, and many other nations require 
armed protection. Yet, out of all these, for some reason Iraq was picked. The only 
explanation for this is that there is some level of national interest which made this 
situation the most important to address. Certainly strong arguments can be made that 
other locations posed a more imminent threat as far as weapons capability (North Korea) 
or deaths of innocents (Darfour). The Bush administration and Congress, however, felt 
that the Iraqi régime was the most important to subdue. Thus we may conclude that Iraq’s 
history probably made it stand out, its continues defiance of UN resolutions made it 
dangerous to world civil authority, and its weapons programs and terrorist connections 
made it dangerous to the United States. “Putting together the admitted existence, by Iraq, 
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of chemical and biological agents with the clear and present danger that such weapons 
could be transferred to international terrorist groups, the prudent statesperson could find 
reasons to act in order to reduce that threat”29 As we shall see in the last chapter, a 
perceived terrorist threat, with some form of unconventional weapon, is more than likely 
the reason for Iraq making the top of the “list” for the U.S.  
Secondly, we must consider whether the United States was seeking economic or 
security interests. The first idea which comes to mind is that of oil. Oil has been one of 
the most debated aspects of the Iraq war. Yet, the reality is that oil was probably one of 
the smaller factors which contributed to the conflict. As Sam Vankin writing for the 
United Press International points out, “The United States [in as much as it was seeking 
oil] would probably have taken over Venezuela, a much larger and closer supplier with 
its own emerging tyrant to boot.”30 We must realize that “the flow of Iraqi crude is 
simply too insignificant to warrant such an exertion”31 since “Middle Eastern oil accounts 
for one-quarter of U.S. imports, Iraqi crude for less than one-tenth”32 Therefore we must 
seek some other supporting explanation.  
Upon entering into the first stages of military action against Iraq, President Bush 
explained his intent as “American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military 
operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.”33 
Security, though, is no clearer cut a rationale for the war than is economies. Certainly 
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there was an element of security, for people victimized and treated harshly usually project 
their anger on those who are not suffering like they are. However, the immediate threat is 
yet to be seen, and though the United States leadership may perceive a threat from Iraq, it 
has not acted before this time to fix the problem. There may well be some other 
motivating factors such as the security of oil in the region which contributed to the 
decision leading to the invasion of Iraq, though, as we have discussed, this would not be 
sufficient to warrant military action. The amount of oil derived from Iraq, while not at all 
insignificant, is still small in comparison to other “opportune” targets. Furthermore, the 
assertion that, “Bush seems bent on a personal crusade. One motive is to avenge his 
father. Another seems to be to prove himself to his father”34 fails to explain why there 
would be such overwhelming popular and congressional support for the invasion. Thus, 
we must admit that there were many contributing factors which lead to the invasion of 
Iraq, not all of them entirely just, but neither were they purely subversive of justice. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Reasonable Hope of Victory 
 
 
 The goal of all who embark upon war is, of course, victory. But what does victory 
mean? It could entail any number of scenarios that neutralize an outside threat. But in thr 
just war tradition we are expected to have a “reasonable hope of victory” before 
committing to a conflict. Thus, we must endeavor to determine what form of victory we 
must achieve in order to right the wrong or secure the threat which has driven the country 
to war. Thus the victory required in the Iraq war may differ drastically from that required 
in the first Gulf War. In the case of Iraq we wish to deter a threat which is dependent 
upon a friendly base of operation, that is to say, because the terrorists can derive support 
from the nation of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, we must completely alter and reform the 
world view of the government and citizens of Iraq in order to remove any support they 
may have for terrorists. This contrasts with the first Gulf War endeavored only to expel 
an invading army in the defense of a sovereign nation.  
As a result, victory in the Gulf War was attained by simply repelling the attacker 
and restoring the antebellum borders. The wrong had been righted and Kuwait was safe. 
As a further deterrent the coalition forces attempted to destroy a majority of the 
equipment that Iraq would need for further aggression. Thus, the U.S. victory included, 
but did not require, an attempt to limit Iraq’s war-making ability. This is an important 
point to note. When judging the reasonable hope of victory, righting the wrong did not 
require the destruction of the Iraqi army, but only expelling it from Kuwaiti territory.  
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The current Iraq war requires a radically different standard of victory. It is 
intended to, at least, drastically weaken if not completely defuse the terrorist threat posed 
by Iraq on the United States. In order to achieve this, once military forces have defeated 
the despotic and dangerous ruler in command, they must then rebuild the defeated 
country in the hopes that what was once a dangerous and aggressive nation may be 
transformed into a stable economic power. Thus, the United States will seek to alter the 
standard of living for the people in Iraq and in the end encourage prosperity over 
violence. This concept is not new. It was successfully applied to the rebuilding of 
Germany and Japan after World War II. Nazi Germany parallels the situation in Iraq well. 
The stress and hardships imposed on Germany after the First World War lead directly to 
the initiation of the second. Similarly, the hardships imposed on the people in Iraq 
encourage the development of the terroristic tendencies that pose a direct threat to the 
United States.  
 The first form of victory I have mentioned, that of repelling an aggressor, is 
perhaps the most acceptable casus belli, and by far the easiest to achieve. Should an 
aggressive nation in a time of peace cross, unprovoked, into the territory of a peaceful 
nation with the intent to deprive that nation of its property and sovereignty through the 
use of force, then, the aggressive nation has committed an obvious and damnable act. 
When the invaded country considers the criterion of reasonable hope of victory, they 
need only calculate the effort that will be required to repel the attacker. Indeed, it is 
simple to rally the people to support and forge a resistive identity to achieve the clear 
restoration of the antebellum status quo. Furthermore, it is apparent that the goal of the 
conflict will be to right the wrong committed: expulsion of the invading forces. The 
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defending nation does not consider the total destruction of the attacker, merely the 
deterrence of aggression. Thus, as the defending nation considers its chances for victory 
it may take into account that armies operating in the theater of their own nation have what 
we might call a “home field advantage.” They know and understand the terrain, they can 
easily re-supply from the already existing infrastructure, and they have a ready source of 
new soldiers who could be recruited and moved to the front quickly. Consider the Roman 
army at the height of the empire. The intent was to solidify and preserve their holdings; 
this desire essentially required the protection of the borders from “barbarians.” The 
Romans depended on their infrastructure of roads that would allow legions to move 
quickly around the country to meet an invading force. Roman solders could derive 
support from the surrounding land and were easily re-supplied when fighting on their 
own territory.  
 A country that seeks only to defend its national borders enjoys enormous 
advantage. In contrast, the nation that is the unjust invader must expend many of its 
resources in maintaining its armies abroad. Thus a much weaker, and economically 
inferior, nation may justly defend effectively against an unjust aggressor. In contrast, the 
idea of a pre-emptive strike employs an entirely different standard of victory. What is the 
wrong that an anticipatory strike wishes to right? Indeed, the key element of this action is 
that no wrong has yet been committed. Thus as a nation which seeks to head off conflict 
with a fight fire with fire approach, we must have a much greater “horizon” for victory. 
The just first strike must have the goal of not only ending what is an immediate threat 
leading to a war like that discussed above, the attacking nation must seek to eliminate the 
sentiment and ideals which flowered into the immediate threat. Thus, as the United States 
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wishes to prosecute a just pre-emptive strike, the end goal must be a restructuring of Iraq 
in such a way that it will cease to be a breeding ground for anti-American violence. 
 If this form of reconstructive victory is not fully achieved, it results in drastic 
failure. Indeed, this type of goal could easily be one step forward, but two steps back. 
Failure to follow through in this pursuit often leaves a nation destitute and engenders an 
even greater rage and hatred in its peoples, which quickly springs into yet another 
conflict. After winning the military aspects of the First Punic War, Rome preceded to 
take Carthaginians provinces in an attempt to weaken their old enemy. Yet, as a result of 
these harsh policies, Hannibal emerged as one of the greatest threats Rome ever faced. 
We see a similar situation with the subjugation of Germany after WWI. The German state 
is destroyed and all money needed to rebuild the country and maintain a quality of life 
essential to avoid unrest is punitively drained from the state in reparation. This, of course, 
results in the rise of the Nazi party under Adolph Hitler, with a more devastating and 
advanced military that defeated of all of Europe.  
 For the United States the requirement for victory is dependent upon the threat it 
wishes to subdue. Since the goal is to make Iraq a secure state, the United States must, (1) 
win the military engagements (2) topple the government of Saddam Hussein, and (3) 
most importantly and most difficult, it must rebuild and re-establish Iraq as a prosperous 
and self supporting nation. This third element is the essential requirement, though this 
“conquest and political reconstruction of the state” may be the “outer limit” of what is 
acceptable;35  nonetheless it is the only means of reworking the environment of Iraq to 
deter terrorist behavior. Indeed, the reconstruction of Germany after WWII established it 
                                                 
35 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 113. 
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as a productive economic power that today invades nations with well-engendered 
consumer products instead of the blitzkrieg. Hence allies would, as Walzer explains, 
“…not negotiate with Nazi leaders, would have no dealings with them of any sort, 
‘except to instruct them about the details of orderly capitulation;’ second, no German 
government would be recognized as legitimate and authoritative until the Allies had won 
the war, occupied Germany, and established a new regime.”36  
 This form of victory, which the United States is required to seek, entails years of 
work and a steady trickle of deaths at the hands of insurgent forces. When judging 
whether or not to engage in a just war, one must consider one’s ability to maintain one’s 
army and morale for an extended period of time in foreign territory. 
Is such a victory possible in the case of Iraq? This question is certainly on 
everyone’s mind, as one writer for the United Press International puts it, “[the Iraq war] 
is certain to generate guerrilla-type resistance that will be reminiscent of the Americans 
in Vietnam, the Russians in Afghanistan, and the Israelis in south Lebanon – three of the 
greatest military fiascos in living memory.”37 This idea is harsh in its criticism and does 
not entirely consider the instances in history where an insurgent force has been overcome. 
Furthermore, it fails to consider all of the factors present in the examples cited. In 
Vietnam the Americans had to curb their use of force and remain ever weary of 
intervention from the Chinese. In Afghanistan the Russians were defeated because the 
United States supplied the Afghani resistance fighters with weapons such as the stinger 
missile, which caused massive losses of Soviet aircraft. This, when combined with the 
economic collapse of the U.S.S.R. made a sustained fight in Afghanistan impossible. As 
                                                 
36 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 113. 
37 Walker, Martin, ed. The Iraq War, 59. 
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long as the Russians had to face an Afghanistan armed with American stinger missiles 
and reinforced through money funneled into the country by the CIA through Pakistan’s 
Inter-Services Intelligence Agency, these comparisons to our war with Iraq are shaky at 
best, for there exists no super power to supply or support the insurgency in Iraq. Indeed, 
the only other superpower in the world, China, does not seem likely to support religious 
radicals. This outlook also fails to take into account instances where insurgencies have 
been rebuffed and defeated by American persistence. After WWII, Germany was infested 
with a group of Nazi insurgents called the “Werewolves”. This group was responsible for 
strategic bombings of key facilities and various assignations. Though this group lasted for 
years with reports of their activities occasionally appearing in newspapers, the American 
resolve did not falter.  
 Thus, there is potentially a light at the end of the tunnel; we have an important 
example which shows us that this form of victory is possible. It has been done before; the 
question is whether we can stomach it in this situation. Not only does the United States 
face a continuing loss of life, but also a debilitating drain of capital resources which must 
necessarily be poured into the devastated country. Even today Germany exists with a 
formidable garrison of American solders. If Iraq is completely abandoned, then there is a 
very real risk that there will soon be another dictator just as dangerous to U.S. peace. 
How, given these challenges, can we be reasonably assured of victory? Certainly it is 
clear that the U.S. military was capable of defeating the military of Iraq. Yet, what 
happens when we face the challenge of rebuilding the country? We will be involved in a 
culture which is unfamiliar, volatile, and promises to be a countryside which will be 
teeming with terrorist wishing to confront the American military. It is doubtful that the 
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American public will continue to maintain an undoubting support for the expenditure of 
the Iraq war, nor does America plan on the kind of long term occupation which was 
required in Germany. Hence, we can question whether a “reasonable hope of victory” is 
present.
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion  
After exploring in depth three main elements of the jus ad bellum which the 
United States would need to posses to commence a just invasion of Iraq, one is left with 
mixed feelings. It is obvious that the U.S. faces what is a military danger; yet, it is also 
apparent that there is no specific country which carries the burden of responsibility for 
the attacks on the World Trade Center. We have seen that in applying each of these 
criteria, gaps are left in the reasoning, and in many cases the tradition requires higher 
levels of proof and certainty than we are able to divine. Nonetheless, I believe that there 
is just war support for the invasion of Iraq; however, to recognize how this may be the 
case requires the positing of a new theory.  
 I would like to propose in this final chapter a theory based on the idea of 
“supreme emergency” introduced in Michael Walzer’s book Just and Unjust War. Walzer 
is very much concerned with the application of just war theory throughout history. Most 
importantly, Walzer is one who believes that the just war tradition is a tool of protection, 
and not of ideological or aggressive aggrandizement. In the modern sense we understand 
a just war as a war of defense. In various illustrations where Walzer applies the just war 
tradition to historical events, he maintains an almost absolutist’s devotion to the 
principles which have been established by the tradition. This reverence for the utility of 
the tradition is not, however, complete. He introduces in his work the idea that there may 
be events that are outside the scope of normal historical events and which allow for 
special dispensation. These exceptional events take the form of “supreme emergency.”  
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 Winston Churchill first coined the term “supreme emergency” in 1939 when 
describing the Nazi threat to Great Britain.38 Walzer points out that when we consider 
this term we are acknowledging that there is a possibility of some greater threat that 
surpasses the normal dangers of war. A “supreme emergency” is something which is 
outside of the normal vision of the law. Indeed, as the concept implies, it occurs when a 
society faces a life-threatening emergency which could result in the annihilation of a 
people and their entire way of life. Walzer introduces his concept of the “supreme 
emergency” with a particular occurrence in mind. This occurrence is Great Britain’s 
inability to effectively preserve its “way of life” through conventional jus in bello 
methods when faced with the threat of Nazi invasion in 1939-40. As Walzer puts it, 
“Nazism was an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, an ideology and a 
practice of domination so murderous, so degrading even to those who might survive, that 
the consequences of its final victory were literally beyond calculation, immeasurably 
awful.”39 Thus, the threat faced is not the loss of some tangible territory or government, 
but the loss of an entire society’s philosophy of life. This unprecedented threat, as a 
result, allows a “stretching” of the bounds of the tradition, for Germany at this time was 
“a threat to human values so radical that its imminence would surly constitute a supreme 
emergency.”40 
 Essentially Walzer’s theory argues that this “supreme emergency” allows a nation 
to over ride the jus in bello or rules which constrain action in war for the specific time 
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40 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 253. 
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that a supreme emergency exists. Furthermore, ignoring the jus in bello carries with it 
specific consequences. Though violating the jus in bello rules may have been necessary, 
it may also be criminal. In what Walzer considers the time of the supreme emergency the 
Royal Air Force (R.A.F.) in 1939 was inflicting trifling amounts of damage on German 
war manufacturing. “British bombers could fly effectively only at night, and given the 
navigational devices with which they were equipped, that they could reasonably aim at no 
target smaller than a fairly large city. A study made in 1941 indicated that of those planes 
which actually succeeded in attacking their target (about two-thirds of the attacking 
force), only one-third dropped their bombs with in 5 miles of the point aimed at.”41 This 
was a shockingly wasteful use of very scarce resources, and though aerial bombardment 
was the only form of defense open to Great Britain at the time, the possibility that it could 
cause any significant damage to military targets was miniscule. The only way to use the 
RAF to any effect was to direct it toward bombing cities.42  
 This change in British policy was a direct violation of the rule against murder 
which is paramount in the jus in bello. According to the rule against murder, the 
intentional killing of the innocent43 as your ends or means to your ends is murder. This is 
exactly what was taking place when the British targeted German cities. This targeting 
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43 Whether or not these people were innocent is a more ambiguous question. Many have 
argued that by contributing to the economic productivity and or moral of the country 
citizens are indirectly responsible for the ability of that country to wage war and thus 
cannot be considered entirely innocent. However, this is not the normally accepted view 
and in the interest of preserving moral decency, and quite a few pages arguing about 
whether or not women and children are innocent, for our purposes we will accept that 
these civilians must be considered noncombatants and innocent. 
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was intentional and ordered by the highest levels of the government as “Bomber 
command was instructed simply to aim at the center of a city.”44 The bombing most 
definitely produced massive amounts of civilian death and destruction.45 
In addition, the deaths of large numbers of civilians was undeniably the means by 
which the British government intended to achieve their goal: “The purpose of the raids 
was explicitly declared to be the destruction of civilian morale”46 and as a result the 
weakening of the German people’s will to fight. Few actions taken in war so clearly 
violate one of the prescriptions of the just war tradition. There is little room to argue that 
the bombing of German cities did not violate the prohibition against murder. Indeed, even 
Walzer acknowledges that this is a direct violation of the just war tradition. Yet, his 
theory seeks to make this violation a permissible exception to the rule. That is to say, he 
sees it as permissible to stretch or break the rules of jus in bello if a situation constitutes a 
“supreme emergency.”  
Walzer adds a qualifier to his theory. He believes that someone (in this case the 
leader of the country) must be held responsible for this violation of the prescription 
against murder. Yet, how the leader is to be punished is left undefined, and the violation 
of the jus in bello remains.  
 Note here that not only does Walzer argue that a rule may be broken, but the 
specific rule that he argues for subverting is one of the most pivotal elements of just war. 
This is not a trivial violation resulting in a few accidental or unwanted deaths, nor is it a 
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dispute of whether enough good had come out of an action to justify the evil produced, as 
required by the theory of proportionality. Instead this action was a form of murder to 
serve for one’s own preservation. It would be as though in order to stop someone from 
killing you, you grabbed your assailant’s daughter and slit her throat with the intent to 
cause so much grief that the assailant’s will to attack you would dissipate. Yet in the case 
of the British fight against Nazism, the moral violation was necessary to avoid a disaster 
of unthinkable proportions. 
 Essentially if we are to accept the idea that the violation of jus in bello is possible 
in the case of a supreme emergency, then it is not such a leap to believe that the violation 
of jus ad bellum principles is possible in a comparable situation. In fact the violation of 
jus ad bellum principles (especially in today’s technologically advanced world) may be 
much easier to stomach than a jus in bello violation. In the case of Iraq I believe there is a 
supreme threat, which strengthens the case for the fulfillment of each of the previously 
discussed jus ad bellum criteria and allows the United States morally to embark upon a 
pre-emptive war of national defense.  
 As we have seen, in order to earn the stamp of justifiable violence, the just war 
tradition requires that the perceived threat meet the jus ad bellum criteria. In the 
proceeding chapters, we have examined some of the most important criteria. Yet, we 
have found the evidence and reasoning somewhat “lacking”. That is to say, the Iraq war, 
by a strict traditional understanding of just ad bellum conventions, is not permissible and 
must be considered unjust. Yet, there is an evident danger that the United States faces, 
and some action needed to be taken to insure the safety of United States citizens within 
their own borders. Times have changed and new threats face those who abide by just war 
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theory. Perhaps, just war theory must adapt to face these threats. Walzer’s “supreme 
emergency” is perhaps the best example in history of the suspension of just law for the 
preservation of society. By making a similar argument, the United States may, in a sense, 
step outside of just war constraints in order to defend against this new form of aggression.  
Thus my theory intends to pick up on Walzer’s argument and carry it to a 
different level. In many ways I believe that the line crossed by my theory is fraught with 
less peril and would be less likely to endanger innocent people than Walzer’s. The line 
that I propose crossing would not allow for murder; rather it would allow only for 
discriminate attacks by justifying the U.S. entry into war. That being said, I do not in any 
way wish to claim that the resulting war has completely refrained from intentional death 
of the innocent, or that there have not been instances where those in the field may have 
overstepped jus in bello constraints.  
As we have discussed in the previous chapters, it is impossible to make an iron 
clad argument for the satisfaction of any of the major jus ad bellum criteria leading up to 
the Iraq war, though it is important to note that there are strong cases for each of these 
criteria. Thus, when I propose that we declare a “supreme threat” and decide that we may 
overstep the constraints of these criteria, I am not declaring that a feeling of fear will 
allow an attack on any country that is clamed as a threat. Instead what “supreme threat” 
would seek to satisfy is a situation which is blurred because potency of evidence is 
deluded by the enemy’s covert style. One may see this comparison akin to a prosecutor 
who may know that a criminal is guilty but be unable to prove this fact beyond a 
reasonable doubt in court.  Yet, unlike the prosecutor, who in the case of a loss may let a 
murderer go free, thus risking the life of some small number of innocents, a state which is 
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unable to defend itself against a threat is risking the lives of a countless number of 
innocents. Thus I propose that amid a “supreme threat” we are allowed to defend 
ourselves against what we know to be a serious peril, but one which, because of secretive 
and underground methods of attack, we are unable to rigidly prove in the context of just 
war. 
The “supreme threat” theory would apply directly to the criteria that we have 
discussed in the preceding chapters. It is clear from our discussions that there is not 
evidence to fulfill the requirements of just cause, just intent, and reasonable hope of 
victory sufficient to warrant a pre-emptive strike. However, there is sufficient evidence 
when the idea of supreme threat is applied. Imagine a bar that must be met or surpassed 
for a war to be considered just. Each of our criteria have come very close to meeting this 
bar, yet there are still shades of grey and doubt which prevent a just war. By not initiating 
this pre-emptive strike the nation is forced to wait for an attack which could very well be 
a knock out punch. In a worst case scenario, a nuclear weapon or weapons could be 
detonated in a U.S. city.  
The “supreme threat” theory seeks to alleviate this possibility. By actively seeking 
to stop states which have shown a willingness to aid terror organizations and develop 
atomic weapons, we may avoid the possibility of this frightening scenario becoming 
reality. The “supreme threat” constituted by this possibility “lowers the bar” and allows 
our body of evidence to meet the jus ad bellum standards of justice. However, it is 
important that once we use this new theory to embark upon a war that we do everything 
in our power to keep the jus in bello criteria and preserve the tradition intact.  
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The extenuating circumstances after the September 11th attacks require one to 
recognize that this covert form of attack called “terrorism” is capable of massively 
destructive strikes. Iraq, before this time, was largely considered impotent; yet, our 
security and diplomacy also based its philosophy on the idea that people will seek to 
preserve their own lives. On September 11th we found that this was a false presumption. 
In light of this, Iraq assumes a new role as not only a nation which incompetently 
attempted terrorism but also as the potential supplier of unconventional weapons to more 
successful terrorist entities.  
Even though the step of the “supreme threat” results in less needless death than 
that of the “supreme emergency,” it should nonetheless be taken only in cases of extreme 
danger. As Michael Ignatieff puts it, “Democratic constitutions do allow some suspension 
of rights in states of emergency. Thus rights are not always trumps. But neither is 
necessity.”47 Thus, in order to suspend what are ironclad rules prohibiting the unjustified 
use of coercive power, we must have a unique and extenuating reason. Indeed, Walzer 
recognizes the danger in making the all too simple and dangerous claim, “in this case the 
rule should be bent or an exception should be made.” It would seem that once the line is 
crossed allowing some rule to be manipulated, that any form of clever wording or 
intelligent sophistry could justify the same extra circumstances in a future conflict.  
We recognize in Walzer’s theory that a supreme danger and imminent destruction 
are required in order to over step the jus in bello; he characterizes it as the loss of a way 
of life. In my theory we must recognize a similar extreme. The very term “war on terror” 
is inconclusive. It stipulates no specific countries, nationality, race, or religion. Some 
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believe that this is simply a politically correct term wishing not to “ruffle” any feathers, 
but the term actually captures the nature of the war very well. There is really no clear idea 
who, how, and where we our fighting! This is an entirely new kind of war. Instead of 
Walzer’s supreme danger coming from an obvious aggressor who wishes to invade us 
and impose a new way of life, this new conflict is fraught by an invisible enemy. We are 
not sure how to confront the current threat. Any clues to future attacks come as hearsay 
and unverifiable evidence. Thus combating this threat purely at home would require a 
change in American philosophy and way of life so drastic that it would be similar to the 
result of Germany occupying Great Britain. All civil liberties would have to be 
suspended, backgrounds probed, and near police state measures enforced in order to 
make sure that no terrorist or covert agents endangered any major civilian concentrations. 
One option would be the total shutdown of immigration in and out of the country. Yet, 
this type of action is certainly not the freedom, liberty, and equality which are the 
American philosophies of life. 
It seems that the war in Iraq offers a better alternative. If the U.S. military can 
focus the conflict in another sphere then it is possible that restrictions on the civil liberties 
so important in the United States could be minimal. Essentially, the idea is: if we can get 
the terrorist to concentrate on fighting the army in Iraq then they will be too occupied to 
attack on our home front. This distraction would allow the preservation of the American 
way of life. We also can disrupt the breeding grounds for terrorism overseas.     
Thus we recognize that war has changed. There is no officially declared enemy, 
which can be distinguished as combatant or noncombatant. Perhaps the closest precedent 
we have to deal with the situation we face is our understanding of espionage. The Third 
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Geneva Convention states, “A captured person not wearing a uniform who is caught 
carrying weapons or engaging in warlike acts (such as a spy) is not a combatant and is 
therefore not protected by the laws of war. Such persons should be treated according to 
applicable civilian laws (if any). In practice they may be executed or tortured” (Geneva 
Convention). We certainly cannot treat all people suspected of being Al Qaeda agents in 
this manner. If so the very livelihood and openness that our country depends on will be 
lost. This “supreme threat” step, then, is required as an element of accommodation in 
order to provide for the necessity of embarking on a just war to quell this threat.  
Thus I believe that the invasion of Iraq was a result of sufficient evidence that a 
“supreme threat” existed and that the chief reason for the war was the protection and 
preservation of the American people and their way of life. I admittedly tread on 
dangerous grounds in granting dispensation for the imperfection in meeting the jus ad 
bellum criteria. However, like Walzer, I believe that when faced with a necessary action, 
one must re-examine the tradition and look to past precedents which may set the stage for 
our actions to be consistent with just war. Should the tradition fail to protect those who 
preserve it, it has failed the test of time. 
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